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A Response
to Hardin
andBharati

Robert]. Wolfson

H

ardin has two general and several specific concerns: His
general concerns are these: (1) The introduction of a social
science lexicon through which extant theories can be restated
and new theories constructed will probably not foster significant
theoretical advances. (2) For social science, formalization may be one
step short of ossification.
I would not argue that formalization is a magic key. I do not expect
that by ''putting on the glittering mask of natural science" I can
"capture its explanatory power." Indeed, I agree that if the social
sciences were to undergo forced formalization, they would become set
in concrete. But what I propose is nothing of the sort. Rather, I suggest
that social scientists be exposed to examples of what might be gained by
the use of a specific formal language-that is, increased clarity of
expression and the power to engage in logical analysis. Those who find
a formal language a useful notion-either the general idea or the particular instance-might then start using it, or something like it. Those
who don't find a formal language useful would ignore it. If a formal
language became sufficiently attractive to a sufficient number, it might
become a standard medium of scientific discourse; if not, it would
disappear. But the idea seems to some of us worth investigating.
Plato's cautionary remark (a good theory must carve nature at the
joints), which Hardin mentioned, seems appropriate for a field in
which the practitioners can agree as .to what and where nature's joints
are. But social scientists are less able to agree than those in some other
fields. No doubt a particular formalization carries with it certain freight
-implications as to where nature's joints are assumed to be, and what
they are. For those who agree on this matter, a particular formalization
consistent with that agreement may be very useful. For others, a
different formalization might be more helpful. But it is one thing to be
faced with what Hardin calls "usefully elastic terminology," quite
another to be faced with mush. My collaborators and I have felt for a
long time that mush is much more descriptive of the lexical state of
affairs in the social sciences than is useful elastic terminology.
Turning now to Hardin's particular questions: My collaborators and I
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deal with belief in terms of the investigator's acceptance of some manifestation as sufficient grounds for his (the investigator's) concluding as
to some state of belief by the observed. What is involved is not an
assertion by us as to fact but a description of the grounds on which the
observer or investigator will believe that a state of belief exists. Thus
F-bel-p may be read as So far as the investigators can tell, individuals
which have F believe p.
The p in F-bel-p is an object of the investigation. It is stated in the
same language as are all other objects of the investigation. That is, p is
the object of, not a part of, formal scientific discourse. So p is in this
formal scientific lexicon only if the lexicon includes true descriptions of
the objects of the investigation.
In speaking of revolution, the word lawful was used to refer to the
explicit or implicit procedural constraints within which the organization
is governed. It should be possible to describe (1) the process wherein
agreement on these matters was arrived at, and (2) the content, in
behavioral terms, of the agreement. So lawful is not a normative term
but a descriptive one.

B

harati's remarks express, at great length and repeatedly, a far
more fundamental concern-dismay, or anxiety, if I read him
correctly. He seems uncertain as to whether what he does is
science or art. Bharati appears to concur with the popular but erroneous
notion that science is the most desirable label for a scholarly pursuit.
Consequently his tactic is to modify this term so that instead of the
phrase social science, he speaks of idiographic social science. This is a
different view of science than the customary one. Who speaks of idiographic natural science? For Hume, and almost all other philosophers
of science, the term science refers to studies whose objectives are the
development of generalizations about natural phenomena and of something like causal laws. Clearly these are not objectives of Bharati's
idiographic sciences.
Bharati's invocation of Godel's theorem involves a misunderstanding
of its implications. One can apply Godel's theorem with equal appropriateness to arguments that (1) the natural sciences are an impossible
project, and (2), as Bharati argues, the social sciences are an impossible
project.
The dismissal of abstract treatments of empirical phenomena with
the complaint that "they have little to do with actual people and actual
languages" is simply a dismissal, and not a refutation, of claims about
the utility of such concepts. By the same logic, quarks could be said to
have little to do with actual matter and energy, and genes to have little
to do with actual people.
In the final analysis the difference between Bharati and me seems to
be that he believes either that there are no regularities in the social
universe, or that the social universe is not analyzable in terms of
abstract notions subject to rigorous logical manipulations; while I
disagree with him on both these claims. Human social and individual
behavior are part of the natural universe and should, in a very general
sense, be capable of analysis in the same way as the rest of the natural
universe is: not necessarily, to be sure, with electrodes, test tubes, or
voltmeters but with abstractions which lend themselves to formal
manipulation-with logical analysis and formal models.
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